








The strategy is to first present the usual content atomistic fullness approaches, in their oc-
current and dispositional guises. Then, the focal point semantic treatments are summarized. 
This difference may be explained through workings of chromatic illumination from the local 
external information inviting incline surrounding at the background cognitive landscape, 
in two directions. First, the external information is appreciated, and thus becomes a total 
cognitive state non-dimensional point at the middle level of the cognitive system’s descrip-
tion. At the upper level of description, total cognitive state content obtains its experiential 
richness from the multiple characteristics present in the mentioned local environment, and 
appreciated in it, without which they would be explicitly represented in epistemic agent’s 
consciousness. Failure of this second step leads to the requirement of content’s explicit 
representation. In comparison, the failure to apply chromatic illumination to the external 





Content	 tends	 to	be	presented	 in	an	atomistic	 fullness	accepting	manner,	 a	
strategy	 embraced	by	models	 of	mind	 and	views	 about	 content.	This	 goes	
for	occurrent	and	for	dispositional	contents.	Atomistic	fullness	of	content	is	
a	questionable	 strategy,	 considering	content’s	vagueness	and	psychological	


























As	preliminaries	we	 introduce	 the	 topics	 of	 cognitive	 system’s	 description	
and	that	of	chromatic	illumination.	We	believe	that	both	are	related	to	how	
one’s	approach	to	content	proceeds.







However,	 then,	 the	 thought	 featuring	 its	content	about	 the	cat	may	also	be	
described	at	the	upper	level	of	the	cognitive	system’s	description.	Here,	the	
thought	in	question	appears	as	Total Cognitive State (TCS), featuring all the 
characteristics	and	properties	which	are	specific	 to	it.	This	tends	to	be	seen	
as the basis of psychological	description	involving	the	thought	in	question,	
including	its	content.
In	between	these,	there	is	the	middle level	of	the	cognitive	system’s	descrip-




are	 to	be	 found	 in	 connectionist	 systems	may	 treat	 contents	 at	 this	middle	
level	of	the	cognitive	system’s	description	as	points	in	the	multidimensional	



























We	 introduced	 chromatic  illumination  as	 an	 experiential	 phenomenology-
based	mechanism	which	provides	epistemic	justification	 for	a	certain	belief	





















one	would	 represent	 in	one’s	consciousness	all	 the	multiple	 reasons	which	
lead	one	to	grasp	it.	And	yet,	these	reasons	do	all	affect	one’s	consciousness,	
for	otherwise,	one	would	not	be	able	 to	get	 the	 joke.	So	 these	 reasons	are	
appreciated	 in	 one’s	 consciousness	without	 being	 explicitly	 represented	 in	
it.	We	say	that	reasons	chromatically illuminate the moment of joke-getting. 











The basis of chromatic illumination	is	that	the	total	cognitive	state	along	with	













nomenology,	 it	becomes	a total cognitive state non-dimensional point  posi-
tioned	at	this	landscape.	This	is	the	first	act	of	chromatic illumination. Given 
that	the	usual	approaches	tend	to	require	explicit	representation	in	conscious-
ness	 to	 come	 to	 the	 total	 cognitive	 state,	 they	 thereby	neglect	appreciation 































a. Content’s Atomistic Fullness




























Mental	 content	 is	usually	portrayed	as	a	presentational	 reflexive	 conscious	
package.	 It	 tends	 to	be	 seen	as	 a	 full	 presentational	 content.	This	 involves	
the representation of proposition p	and	its	conscious	awareness.	This	is	often	
presented as intentional	content.	If	I	form	a	belief	about	a	cat	being	here,	I	
am	supposed	to	be	directed	at	the	content	[cat].	That	content	is	supposed	to	
be	different	 from	other	contents,	 such	as	 [dog],	 [cup],	having	very	 little	or	
preferably	nothing	in	common	with	them.	The	very	intentional	directedness	
of	myself	 at	 the	 content	 such	 as	 [cat]	 also	 presupposes	my	 full	 conscious	
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ly	 non-physical	 and	 non-mental.	 Platonism	
in this sense is a contemporary	view.”	In	this	
manner,	 Platonism	 does	 not	 involve	 mental	
content	which,	as	we	argue,	includes	both	spa-
tial  and  temporal  potentialities.  Opposed  to  
Platonism	is	nominalism,	according	to	which	
naturalism	is	compatible	with	the	dismissal	of	
abstract	 entities	 (Field	 1980),	 following	 the	
Ockham’s	razor	principle	(see	its	mention	in	
Potrč	2020).
2   
In	Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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See	Horgan,	 Potrč	 and	Tienson	 eds.	 (2002),	
where	the	link	between	the	so-called	continental 
 
and	 analytic	 traditions	 is	 firmly	 affirmed,	
contrary	to	myopic	part-taking	still	persisting	
in	most	 of	 academia.	 Zalta	 (2002)	mentions	
the	following	names	and	topics	in	the	linked	
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Twardowski	 (1894)	 brought	 attention	 to	 the	
content/object	 intentionality	 distinction.	 See	
Sajama	(1987).





in	 Ljubljana,	 Potrč	 took	 him	 to	 the	 town	 of	





to be atomistic,	i.e.	self-sufficient	 and	independent	from	its	peers.	It	is	also	
supposed to  be full	 in	 the	sense	 that	everything	related	 to	 the	content	 [cat]	













This	seems	 to	help	 in	a	semantically	based	understanding	so	 that	 the	 inde-
pendence	of	 the	content	 [cat]	does	not	get	mixed	up	with	 [dog]	or	 [chair].	





Fullness	 represents	 those	characteristics	of	content	 from	which	 the	content	
is	 made	 and	 all	 characteristics	 which	 it	 links	 to	 and	 is	 determined	 by	 it.	
Thus,	 content	 [cat]	 comes	 with	 all	 the	 properties	 which	 it	 involves,	 such	
as	 animal,	 vertebrate,	 pet,	 etc.	 This	 relies	 upon	 an	 understanding	 of	 the	
content’s	innateness.	Here	is	an	argument	to	this	effect,	provided	by	the in-
natism-centred	language	of	thought	hypothesis,	as	against	non-full	or	partial	












Thus,	 there	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 gradual	 variation	 proper	 to	 one’s	 psychological	






















one aims to possess a reliable guide to the result, as this one is based upon 
the available data. The Language of Thought	(Fodor	1975)	was	the	first	philo-
sophical	proposal	for	a	model	of	mind	after	its	behaviourist	black	box	dismis-
sive	treatment.	Objective	measurement	techniques	of	input	and	output	were	











consciously	 represented	 in	 an	occurrent	manner.	Tractability	of	 rules	 deal-
ing	with	content	is	well-entrenched,	especially	in	functionalist	approaches	to	
the	mind.	Explicit	representation	of	content	goes	along	with	our	mentioned	





b. Occurrent and Dispositional Content





6	   
Renderings	of	 contents	 as	 prototypes	or	 ste-
reotypes	allowed	for	the	gradual	and	specific	















The	supposition	 is	 that	both	of	 these	 forms	of	content	share	atomistic  full-































features,	 its	 fullness.	This	 evidence	 aims	 at	 the	 possibility	 to	 reach	 any	of	
the	richly	full	constituents	 involved	by	 the	content.	 In	 this	way,	we	see	at-
omistic	fullness,	according	to	clara et distincta perceptio	being	approached	
and	justified.	The	evidence	aims	at	reaching,	at	least	in	principle,	any	of	the	
many	(full	house)	content	characteristics.	Belief	formation	involving	certain	















p happens in an indirect, appreciative manner:9	the	possible	evidence	in	sup-
port	of	propositional	justification	of	the	content	that p needs to be appreciated 
by	the	epistemic	or	cognitive	agent.	This	injects	a	normative	ingredient	into	
the	story,	given	that	appreciation	(without	the	explicit	formation	of	represen-
tation)	 is	 itself	a	normative	manner.	But	 is	 there	support	 for	such	a	move?	
We	 claim	 that	 both	 atomism and	 explicit	 fullness	 of	 content	 requirements	
defy	psychologically	plausible	considerations	to	which	we	subscribe,	along	
with	 the	practical	 stance	of	beliefs	 and	contents.	The	presupposition	about	











ing	 belief	 or	 content	 formation	 and	 justification.	 The	 first	 limitation	 is	 the	










Let	us	first	 put	 into	question	 the	presupposed	content’s	well-delineated	at-
omism.	There	may	well	 be	 atoms	 that	 are	 vague,	 and	 some	 people	would	








mental-physical	 identity	 theories,	 of	 which	
there	are	token-identity	(Davidson	1980)	and	
type-identity	 (U.T.	 Place	 1956)	 variants.	At	
the	Veber	international	conference	in	Maribor,	
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It	 is	 the	 becausal  move  from  propositional  









as an appreciative  move upon the normative 



























start	 searching	 for	an	account	 that	would	avoid	 its	 trap.	That	may	 turn	out	













with	 the	 tempted	 exclusion	 of	 the	 descriptive	 fullness.	 In	 this	manner,	 the	
reductive	effort	shifts	from	the	causal	external	to	the	epistemic	direct	demon-












cognitive	system.	Nevertheless,	one	needs	 to	 recognize	 the	 involvement	of	
the	first-person	point	of	view	phenomenological	perspective	in	such	a	move.	
A	review	of	some	positions	will	make	this	clear,	we	hope.
a. Content’s Focal Point to the Rescue
Atomistic	fullness	troubles	lead	to	a	proposal	about	distinguishing	content’s	
focal	point	from	the	abundance	of	its	semantic	surroundings.
We have seen that atomistic fullness	presupposition	can	be	questioned.	The	
presupposed	atomism	of	content	implies	its	strict	boundaries	delineation.	These	
may	be	adopted	by	platonic	content	approaches,	which	tend	to	be	embraced	




Standard	 approaches	 to	 content	 took	an	atomistic	 fullness	 angle	 in	 the	be-
lief	 that	 they	could	cherish	 tractable	principles	guiding	models	of	mind,	or	
again	evidentialist	 representational	 reflexive	 conscious	 (actual	or	potential)	
access	to	the	fullness	of	a	certain	content’s	characteristics.	Given	that	there	















Perhaps	 the	most	popular	 focal  point	 is	not	psychological	 teaching,	as	one	
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In	 French,	 for	 punctual	 and	 fainting.	 From	
my	memory	 of	 reading	Descartes,	 some	 of	
his	 works	 were	 written	 in	 Latin	 (similarly	
as	I	write	nowadays	in	English Latin),  from 
which	 I	 use	 my	 memory	 of	 reading	 about	










































name	despite	all	 the	different	causal	chains	 that	may	 in	 sometimes	contin-
gent	manner	link	my	use	of	the	name	to	him.	A	historical	causal	connection	









The	 precursor	 of	 the	 discussed	 focal	 point	 adopting	 approaches	 of	 exter-
nalist	objectivism	is	 the	theory	of	 logical proper name,	 introduced	by	Ber-
trand	Russell	 (1905)	as	one	basis	of	his	 theory	of	descriptions.	Here,	Rus-
sell	 attacked	what	we	 call	 richness	 of	 content	 by	 expelling	 all	 descriptive	









me	and	say	“That!”	This	 is,	 then,	a	 logical	proper	name,	distinguishing	 it-
self	through	the	lack	of	any	connotative	or	descriptive	richness,	or	content’s	















the	 sense	 that	 it	 brings	 us	 from	 the	 objective	 externalist	 to	 the	 subjective,	
perhaps	internalistically	supported	relation,	directly	involving	the	epistemic	
agent	and	the	referent	at	which	it	aims.



































a. Dynamical Cognition Treatment of the Total Cognitive State
Only	the	dynamical	cognition	model	provides	a	plausible	perspective	to	the	
zero	point	content,	first	by	reducing	the	usual	atomistic	fullness	of	total	cog-
nitive state to its being positioned as a non-dimensional point at the multidi-
mensional	background	cognitive	landscape.	
Content	as	total	cognitive	state	(TCS)	realized	as	a	non-dimensional	point	at	









to just one feature-less referential point. This point is perhaps assessed from 
one’s	first-person	perspective,	but	this	comes	at	the	second	stage.
In	fact,	what	we	engage	into	as	we	think	about	the	cat	or	as	we	form	a	be-







illuminate	 the	 non-dimensional	 referential	 point.	All	 this	may	 happen	mo-
mentarily.
That	is	just	an	opposite	take	upon	the	previously	mentioned	mental	content’s	
























to this the third dimension,	which	enables	you	to	conceive	the	variability	of	
the	multidimensional	landscape	in	time.	One	can	take	the	downward	direction	
of	the	landscape	to	depict	its	timely	progress.16
In	 summary,	we	 face	 the	 reduction	of	 full	 atomistic	 content	 to	 the	non-di-
mensional point, situated at the multidimensional, rich, dynamical	cognitive	
background	landscape,	which	as	mentioned	may	be	portrayed	in	two dimen-
sions	so	that	one	can	represent	it,	or	in	three dimensions, so that its temporal 
incline	is	considered.









indeed  dispositional  but  inherits  full atomistic intentional reflexively con-
scious	approach.	This	 is	countered	by	morphological	content,	 relying	upon	
12   
A	 Fregean	 sense	 perhaps,	 in	 respect	 to	 the	
perspective	that	it	involves.	The	questionable	
point	with	it,	however,	 is	that	its	perspective	
is	 supposed	 to	be	nonvague,	which	 counters	
our	experiences.	
13   
The	demonstrative	form	in	Potrč	2017.
14   
Connectionist	 computational	 architecture	 is	
opposed	 to	 the	 classical	 computer-inspired	
cognitive	architecture,	with	its	atomistic	rep-
resentations	 and	 exceptionless	 logical	 rules	
taking	care	of	their	arrangements	(Churchland	
2012).
15	   
See	Horgan	(2016,	2017).
16	   
This	is	certainly	a	simplification	which	allows	
representing  the  supposed  three-dimensional  
situation	in	two	dimensions,	as	the	mentioned	
landscape.	 A	 timely	 downward	 direction	 of	
the	 landscape	 would	 then	 involve	 the	 third	
dimension.	However,	 usually	 one	 can	 repre-
sent	 oneself	 three	 spatial	 dimensions,	 with	
the	 fourth	dimension	coming	as	 that	of	 time	
(physicists	 are	 sceptical	 here).	 We	 struggle	






the	 shape,	 morphology,	 of	 the	 multidimensional	 landscape,	 to	 obtain	 its	
specificity.





Standard dispositional content	 is	 nothing	 else	 but	 full	 atomistic	 inherent	








nisms,	extended	 to	 the	massive	modularity	 to	encompass	higher	cognition,	
such	as	an	account	of	belief	formation.
b. Landscape Environments Providing Richness to the Semantic Point









ronment	 to	 the	TCS	non-dimensional	point	positioned	upon	 that	 landscape.	
Suppose	TCS	is	the	content	involved	in	belief	formation	and	accordingly	into	

























poral) dimension provides a genuine ex-sistence	plan	to	the	cognitive	agent.	
This	 is	 opposed	 to	 the	 everyday	 forgetful	 “we	 all	 do	 this”	 existence,	 such	
as	watching	TV.	Compare	this	to	Heidegger’s	genuine	existence	in	Sein und 
Zeit	(1927)	and	the	everyday	“man”,	as	in	“man	denkt,	man	arbeitet”	cases.
c. The Shape of the Landscape
We	are	confronted	with	morphological	content,	coming	from	the	shape	of	the	
multidimensional	landscape.	







d. Momentary Relevant Enrichment
Morphological	content	relevantly	enriches	zero	point	content	in	a	qualitative	
experiential	semantic	moment.
Zero	 point	 content,	 i.e.	TCS	non-dimensional	 point	 positioned	 at	 the	mul-
tidimensional	 background	 cognitive	 landscape,	 gets	 to	 the	 point,	 one	may	
say,	 in	 the	 local	momentary	 cognitive	 environment,	 with	 its	 support	 from	

































Chromatic illumination is	a	manner	 in	which	causes	are	effective	by	being	
appreciated.	Without	that,	they	would	be	explicitly	consciously	represented. 
This,	 then,	 involves	 qualitative	 phenomenological	 consciousness,	 differ-
ent	 from	 the	 reflexive	 transparent	evidential	 richness	promising	conscious-
ness.	Total	 cognitive	 state	 non-dimensional	 point	 is	 the	 zero	 point	 content	
appearing	at	the	middle	level	of	the	cognitive	system’s	description	so	that	the	
incoming	external	 information	gets	appreciated	and	 invited	 to	settle	by	 the	
chromatic	 illumination	 from	 the	 relevant	 local	 landscape	area	surrounding,	
which	attracts	that	information.	At	the	same	time,	the	mentioned	surrounding	
also	chromatically	illuminates	the	phenomenologically	constituted	zero	point	
content	 appearing	 at	 the	 upper	 level	 of	 the	 cognitive	 system’s	 description.	











of	 the	 cognitive	 system’s	description,	 through	 illumination	by	 the	 richness	
of	the	local	environment	where	it	gets	positioned.	Ignoring	this	appreciative	
move	 leaves	one	with	external	 information	as	 a	 semantic	 referential	point.	
Referential	act,	however,	rests	upon	epistemic	agent’s	first-person	 phenom-
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Strategija je najprije predstaviti uobičajene pristupe sadržajne atomističke potpunosti, u njiho-
vim okurentnim i dispozicijskim oblicima. Zatim, sažima se semantički tretman fokalne točke. 
Razlika se može objasniti radom kromatičke iluminacije iz izvanjske lokalne informacije, po-
zivajući strma okruženja u pozadini kognitivnog pejzaža, u dva smjera. Prvo, uzima se u obzir 
izvanjska informacija, čime se dolazi do potpunog kognitivnog stanja nedimenzionalne točke u 
srednjoj razini opisa kognitivnog sustava. Na gornjoj razini opisa, sadržaj totalnog kognitiv-
nog stanja zaprima svoje iskustveno bogatstvo iz više karakteristika prisutnih u spomenutom 
lokalnom okruženju, te su u njemu prihvaćene, bez čega bi bile eksplicitno reprezentirane u 
svijesti epistemičkog agenta. Neuspjeh drugog koraka vodi do obveze na eksplicitnu predodžbu 
sadržaja. Usporedno, neuspjeh primjene kromatičke iluminacije na izvanjsku informaciju vodi 








Die Strategie besteht zunächst darin, die gebräuchlichen Ansätze der inhaltlichen atomistischen 
Vollkommenheit in ihren okkurenten und dispositionalen Formen darzustellen. Anschließend 
wird die semantische Behandlung des fokalen Punkts zusammengefasst. Der Unterschied lässt 
sich durch die Aktivität der chromatischen Illumination aus der externen lokalen Information, 
indem man steile Umgebungen im Hintergrund der kognitiven Landschaft anspricht, in zwei 
Richtungen erläutern. Zunächst wird die externe Information berücksichtigt, womit man zu 
einem vollkommenen kognitiven Zustand des nicht dimensionalen Punkts in der mittleren Ebe-
ne der Beschreibung des kognitiven Systems gelangt. Auf der oberen Ebene der Beschreibung 
erwirbt der Inhalt des totalen kognitiven Zustands seinen Erfahrungsreichtum aus mehreren 
Merkmalen, die in der erwähnten lokalen Umgebung vorhanden und in dieser akzeptiert sind, 
ohne die sie im Bewusstsein des epistemischen Agenten explizit repräsentiert würden. Das 
Scheitern des zweiten Schritts führt zu der Verpflichtung zu einer expliziten Darstellung des 
Inhalts. Parallel dazu führt der Fehlschlag, die chromatische Illumination auf die externe In-





Le contenu du point zéro
Résumé
Notre stratégie consiste à présenter en premier lieu les approches habituelles de la complétude 
atomistique substantielle, sous leurs formes d’occurrences et de dispositions. En second lieu, 
nous résumons le traitement sémantique du point focal. La différence peut être expliquée par le 
biais du travail d’illumination chromatique à partir d’une information externe, faisant appel à 
un environnement rude en arrière-plan du paysage cognitif qui s’engage dans deux directions. 
Premièrement, l’information externe, au travers laquelle nous parvenons à un état cognitif com-
plet du point non dimensionnel au niveau intermédiaire de la description du système cognitif, est 
examinée. Au niveau supérieur de la description, l’état cognitif complet reçoit sa richesse d’ex-
périence à partir de plusieurs caractéristiques présentes dans l’environnement local mentionné 
qui y sont acceptées, sans quoi elles seraient explicitement représentées dans la conscience de 
l’agent épistémique. L’échec de la deuxième étape conduit à une représentation explicite du 
contenu. En comparaison, l’échec de l’application de l’illumination chromatique sur l’informa-
tion externe mène à des stratégies du point focal d’externalisme sémantique.
Mots-clés
contenu,	 point	 zéro,	 contenu	morphologique,	 cognition	 dynamique,	 niveaux	 de	 description,	
paysage	cognitif
